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Abstract
Federal Reserve policymakers began reporting their economic forecasts to Congress in
1979.  These forecasts are important because they indicate what the Federal Open Market
Committee (FOMC) members think will be the likely consequence of their policies.  The
Fed reports both the range (high and low) of the individual policymaker's forecasts and a
truncated central tendency.  The central tendency range omits outliers from both the top
and the bottom of the full range.  Generally, I find that the forecasts derived from the full
range are at least as good as those derived from the central tendency and in a few cases,
significantly better. 
KEYWORDS: Monetary Policy, Consensus Forecasts, Predictive Uncertainty 
JEL CLASSIFICATION: E37, E52
William T. Gavin
Vice President and Economist 
Research Department
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
P.O. Box 442
St. Louis, MO 63166
Ph. (314) 444-8578 
FAX (314) 444-8731
Thanks to Mike Dueker, Kevin Kliesen, Chris Neely, and Bob Rasche for helpful
comments.  Athena Theodorou provided research assistance. 1
1. Introduction
Since 1980, there has been a substantial improvement in the performance of
monetary policy among most of the industrialized countries.  Bernanke et al. (1998)
attribute this success to the adoption of inflation targeting, but they are somewhat vague
in defining what it means to be have an inflation target.  Even countries that do not have
numerical inflation targets are said to be inflation targeting if they focus on a long-term
objective for price stability (low inflation) and publish inflation forecasts.  By this broad
definition, even the Federal Reserve may be considered to have had an inflation target.
This article describes and documents 23 years of FOMC forecasts.  Congress
required the Fed to begin preparing and reporting forecasts in 1979.  Section 108 of the
Humphrey-Hawkins Act explicitly required the Fed to submit "written reports setting
forth (1) a review and analysis of recent developments affecting economic trends in the
nation; (2) the objectives and plans … with respect to the monetary and credit aggregates
…; and (3) the relationship of the aforesaid objectives and plans to the short-term goals
set forth in the most recent Economic Report of the President …"   In order to satisfy the
third item, the Federal Reserve Chairman began reporting a summary of Fed
policymakers' forecasts to Congress in July 1979.
1  Since then, similar summaries of
forecasts have been reported every February and July.  Forecasts are made of annual,
fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates for nominal GDP, real GDP, and
inflation.
2  Fed policymakers also forecast the average level of unemployment for the
fourth quarter of the year.  In February, the forecasts pertain to the current calendar year
                                                
1 The reporting requirements of the Humphrey-Hawkins Act expired in May 2000.  The Congress
amended and continued the reporting requirements in the American Homeownership and Economic
Opportunity Act of 2000 (Section 1003).  
2 The Fed followed the Bureau of Economic Analysis, switching from GNP to GDP in 1992.2
(referred to below as the 12-month-ahead forecasts).  In July, forecasts are updated for
the current calendar year (6-month-ahead forecasts) and preliminary projections are made
for the next calendar year (18-month-ahead forecasts). 
Separate forecasts are made by each of the Federal Open Market Committee
(FOMC) members (and nonvoting Federal Reserve Bank presidents), but the individual
forecasts are not published.
3   Rather, the Fed reports two summary statistics: first, the
low and the high forecast among all the policymakers, and second, the central tendency,
which has been reported since February 1983, is a smaller range that omits extreme
forecasts. 
This paper evaluates the information content of the two summary statistics, the
full range and central tendency.  I define two FOMC forecasts: One is the midpoint of the
full range (FR) and the other is the midpoint of the central tendency range (CT).  The
paper includes a comparison of forecast accuracy, tests for bias and efficiency, and
encompassing tests to see if one or the other of these summary statistics encompassed the
other.  Admittedly, the two forecasts calculated from the range and central tendency are
quite close.  In many of the tests, we cannot distinguish between the two.  However,
where statistically significant differences exist, they generally favor the use of the full
range.  
                                                
3 The FOMC is the policymaking committee of the Federal Reserve System.  When the Board is full, the
Committee consists of the 7 governors of the Board, the president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York, and 4 of the remaining 11 Federal Reserve Bank presidents who serve on a rotating basis.  All 12
presidents attend every meeting, contribute to the discussion, and provide forecasts that are summarized in
testimony to the Congress.  In this article, when we refer to the FOMC forecasts we mean the summary of
forecasts that are collected from FOMC members and non-voting Federal Reserve Bank presidents. 3
2. The Historical Record
Two alternative FOMC forecasts are defined: the midpoint of the full range (FR)
and the midpoint of the central tendency (CT).  If the outlying forecasts are symmetric,
then the two will be the same. The FOMC has generated a large number of forecasts
since 1979.  There are two alternative ranges for each of four forecasted economic
variables made at three different horizons (24 separate forecast series ranging from 18 to
23 years each). To compare the forecast to the outcome we measure actual output,
inflation and unemployment using real-time data rather than the latest vintage data.  
There is always an issue about how to define the “actual” data because the data
are regularly revised as we get more information about the past.   The analysis in this
paper is based on the real-time data that are maintained at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia.  They created vintages of data that were available in each of the middle of
the months February, May, August and November. The complete detailed forecasts and
real-time data used in this article are compiled in an attached appendix.
4  Except where
explicitly noted, the actual values are taken from the first report for a calendar year that
occurs at the end of January and is stored in the "February" files by the Philadelphia Fed.
In preliminary work I examined the root mean squared errors (RMSE) calculated
using the different versions of the data that became available during the year following
the forecast period.  I found that the FOMC’s nominal GDP and real GDP forecasts were
most accurate for the first released figures reported in February.   The range forecast for
inflation was about equally accurate using the February or November data and the central
tendency inflation forecast was most accurate using the November data.  In all cases the
                                                
4 The forecast data are available in an Excel spreadsheet at URL …4
inflation forecasts were closer to the February version than they were to the May version.
The unemployment data were rarely revised within the first year and there were no
revisions to the fourth quarter average in our sample.
The 12-month forecasts are used to illustrate the FOMC forecasts in Figure 1. The
top panel of Figure 1 shows nominal GDP growth.  Through 1995, the FOMC on average
overpredicted nominal GDP growth.  The nominal GDP forecast errors were particularly
large in years that included recessions: 1981-82, 1990-91, and 2001. On average the real
GDP forecasts shown in the second panel appear to be unbiased, but the forecast errors
were large and negative in recessions and large and positive in the years 1995 through
1999.  There was an unexpected increase in productivity growth during the latter half of
the 1990s.  
The third panel shows the inflation forecasts made by the FOMC.  The FOMC
began forecasting the implicit price deflator for GNP in 1979.  Much of the bias in the
nominal GDP forecast came from a tendency to over-predict inflation in the 1980s.  The
FOMC continued reporting forecasts for the deflator until 1989, when it began making
inflation forecasts in terms of the consumer price index (CPI).  CPI inflation accelerated
to 7 percent in the second two quarters of 1990, exceeding the FOMC forecasts.  Inflation
decelerated rapidly in 1991 and stayed, on average, below the forecast through the 1990s.
In 2000, the FOMC switched once again, this time to the chain price index for personal
consumption expenditures (PCE). 
The fourth quarter average unemployment rate is shown in the bottom panel of
Figure 1.  Here, the interesting features are the secular decline of unemployment that
appears to mirror the decline of inflation, the tendency to over-predict unemployment in5
the 1990s (another facet of the surprisingly high productivity growth), and the relatively
accurate prediction of unemployment in the 1990-91 recession.  
Descriptive statistics and tests comparing the alternative forecasts are shown in
Table 1.   Here we are excluding the early 1980s so that we can compare the forecasts
derived from the full range with the forecasts computed from the central tendency.
 5  Five
statistics are reported in Table 1:  the mean error, the root mean squared error (RMSE), p-
values from a Wilcoxon signed rank statistic that tests whether the RMSEs from the
range and central tendency forecasts are equal, the widths of the intervals for FR and CT,
and the percentage of times that the actual value fell outside the range and central
tendency. 
As we saw with the 12-month forecasts in Figure 1, the FOMC tended to over-
predict inflation, nominal GDP growth and the unemployment rate.  In each of these
cases, the negative bias in the mean error was largest for the 18-month forecasts.  There
was no bias in the 6-month real GDP forecast, and a positive bias in the 12- and 18-
month real GDP forecasts.  
The RMSEs are shown in the second row of each panel.   The nominal GDP
RMSEs were largest, 10 to 20 percent larger than those for real GDP and almost twice as
large as those for inflation.  Generally, the real GDP growth and inflation errors were
weakly negatively correlated.  The probability values of a Wilcoxon signed-rank test are
reported in parenthesis in the third row under the range forecasts.  This is a test of the null
hypothesis that the RMSEs from FR and CT forecasts are equal.  We use a Wilcoxon
                                                
5 See Gavin and Mandal (2002) for an analysis of the full range forecasts for output and inflation during the
period from 1979, including a comparison with the Blue Chip consensus and Green Book forecasts.  They
find that the FOMC’s output forecasts were as good as the Blue Chip and Green Book forecasts. The
FOMC’s inflation forecasts were better than the Blue Chip, but not as good as the Green Book.6
signed-rank statistic because Diebold and Marino (1995) show that this test statistic is
well-sized in cases where the sample is small and the alternative forecast errors are highly
correlated and possible serially correlated—as we expect for the 18-month forecasts.
6  In
only two of the 24 cases is the probability value less than 10 percentæthe 18-month
forecasts for nominal GDP growth and inflation.  In both cases the forecast derived from
the full range was more accurate than the forecast derived from the central tendency.  
The fourth row of each column reports the average width of the range or central
tendency intervals.  The width of the range is the distance in percentage points between
the high and low point forecasts. We define the FOMC consensus forecast as the
midpoint of the range between the high and low forecasts.  A way to gauge whether the
range is a good measure of the uncertainty about the forecast is to see how often the
actual value falls outside the range.  The bottom row in each panel reports the percent of
time that the outcome fell outside the reported range or central tendency.  The actual
values were outside the central tendency most of the time, indeed, all of the time for the
12-month output forecasts. 
The average width of the range for the 18-month output forecasts is 1.55
percentage points.  The actual value fell outside this range 50 percent of the time.  The
range of 12-month output forecasts was almost as wide (1.43 percentage points), but the
actual value fell outside this range 68 percent of the time.  At the shortest horizon, the
width of the range fell to 1.11 percentage points, and the actual value also fell outside of
it 68 percent of the time.  
                                                
6 The 18-month forecast for year t is made before the actual value for year t-1 is known.  Any surprise in
the actual value for year t-1 will be part of the forecast error for year t-1.  This surprise is also likely to be
reflected in the actual value (and forecast error) for year t.   Thus, we can expect first-order serial
correlation in the 18-month forecast errors.7
The economic future is always uncertain and a wider forecast range reflects
greater disagreement among the policymakers about economic trends and policy
objectives.  However, even if the forecasts of all the policymakers were identical (perfect
consensus), they would likely be wrong because the future is inherently unpredictable.
Table 2 attempts to gauge the degree of consensus about the outlook, relative to the
economy’s unpredictability.  The table shows the ratios of the root-mean-squared error
(RMSE) of the consensus forecasts to one-half the width of the forecast ranges.  (We use
one-half the range to make the scale comparable to the RMSE, which is an index of
unpredictability.)  The width of the range is an inverse measure of consensus.  As such,
the ratios reveal, in a simple way, the degree of consensus among the policymakers about
the outlook for a variable relative to the difficulty of predicting that variable.  A high
ratio, for example, indicates a strong consensus regarding the outlook, relative to the
unpredictability of the variable.
In every case except for the 18-month inflation forecasts, the RMSE is larger than
half the width of the range.  Paradoxically, the highest figures (where the consensus is
strong relative to the degree of predictability) are for “real” variables such as GDP and the
unemployment rate, over which the Fed has little control.  At the same time, the smallest
figures are observed for inflation, over which the Fed is widely regarded as having
considerable influence, although perhaps not over horizons as short as 18 months.
The individual inflation forecasts reflect, to a greater or less extent, the
policymaker's beliefs about the desired long-run inflation objective.  Among inflation
forecast horizons, the least consensus emerges for the longest horizon—18 months—
where the Fed’s control presumably is the strongest.  Since the formation of the European8
Central Bank, the United States and Japan are the only major central banks in the world
that do not announce a numerical objective for inflation.  The statistics in Table 2 suggest
one reason why U.S. policymakers may have been reluctant to adopt a specific objective for
inflation--namely, there is little consensus about what the numerical objective should be.   
3.  Are the FOMC Forecasts Unbiased?
There is a problem in evaluating the FOMC inflation forecasts because, as noted
above, the FOMC switched among price indexes over our sample period.  Our analysis in
Figure 1 and Tables 1, 2, and A1 used the inflation forecasts for the different prices
indexes as they were reported.  In the remaining part of the paper, we use an implied
forecast that is calculated by subtracting the midpoint of the range of real GDP forecasts
from the midpoint of the range of nominal GDP forecasts (Tables 3 through 5).  We do
this because the FOMC has consistently forecasted nominal and real output throughout
the entire period.  Even when the Fed was reporting the forecast for inflation based on the
CPI (from 1989 through 1999), they were reporting forecasts for both nominal and real
output, so there was always an implied forecast for the output deflator.
In this section, we check the alternative forecasts for unbiasedness. We estimate
the following regression in the first part of our test for unbiasedness:
  xx tt i t
f
ti t =+ + −− αβ ε ,                                                     (1)
where x is the variable being forecast (the fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rate
of output or the price deflator for output).  The forecast (x
f) is indexed by the time when
the forecast was made (t-i, where i refers to three forecast horizons) and the year to which9
it applies (t).  If the estimates of (a, b) are equal to (0, 1), the forecasts are unbiased.  We
use an F-statistic to test for unbiasedness.  Holden and Peel (1990) show that even if we
can reject the null hypothesis that (a, b) is equal to (0, 1), it is still possible that the
forecasts may be unbiased.  The intuition for their result can be understood by thinking
about equation (1) as a mechanism for combining unbiased forecasts where the constant
is an unbiased forecast of the series.   If we cannot reject the null hypothesis, we can
conclude that the forecast is unbiased.  If we reject the null hypothesis, it is necessary to
examine the properties of the forecast error,  .
f
tt i t x x − −   To make a complete test of
unbiasedness, we also compute the regression
f
tt i t t i t xx
γ γ ε −− −= +            (2)
and test whether γ  is equal to zero.  In addition, we must take account of possible serial
correlation in the error for the July next-year forecast.  Because the forecast horizon is
longer than the interval over which output growth is measured, the forecast error for year
t is not available when the forecasts for year t+1 are made.  Therefore, information that
arrives in the second half of year t may be reflected in forecast errors for both years t and
t+1.  If it is, the errors will display first-order serial correlation.  For this case, Hansen
(1982) has shown that ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates will be unbiased, but the
standard errors will be too small, leading to too many rejections of the null hypothesis.
Therefore we used the correction for serial correlation suggested by Hansen (1982) when
reporting test statistics for the July next-year forecasts.  
OLS estimates of equations (1) and (2) for the FOMC forecasts are listed in Table
3 which includes the estimates of α  and β , with standard errors in parentheses.  The third
column of results shows the probability values of the F-statistic for the null joint10
hypothesis that (a, b) = (0, 1).  For the 12 cases with nominal and real output, the
probability values are all above 10 percent, so we conclude that the output forecasts are
unbiased.   Table 2 also reports the t-statistics for estimates of g in equation (2).   It is not
necessary to estimate equation (2) in the case of the output forecasts, however, because
we could not reject unbiasedness using the F-statistic.  
In contrast, the probability values of the F-statistic for the inflation and
unemployment forecasts are quite low.  In the case of inflation, the F-statistic always
rejects unbiasedness at a 10 percent level.  The fifth column of Table 3 reports the
probability values for the t-statistic for testing whether g is equal to zero.  Here we find
strong evidence that the inflation forecasts are biased, which is not too surprising since
the inflation forecasts were above the actual most of the time (see Figure 1).   In the case
of the unemployment rate, we could reject the joint hypothesis that (a, b) = (0, 1), in five
of the six cases.  In two of those, however, we could not reject that the mean of the
forecast error was zero.  Here, the range forecasts for the unemployment were found to be
significantly biased, but the central tendency forecasts were not.
4.  Are the FOMC Forecasts Efficient? 
Forecasts are considered efficient if the forecaster takes account of all relevant
information.  This means that forecasters continue to invest in using more information as
long as benefits of using more information exceed the costs of acquiring it.  In practice,
we check for informational efficiency by testing whether the forecast errors are
systematically related to information that was readily available when the forecasts were
made.  Because the data set is small, we check for a bivariate relationship between the11




t it t itj t it ex u αβ −− − − =+ +                                                           (3)
where t i t e - is the forecast error for year t (for either output or inflation) made at the t-i
horizon.  So there will be a total of 24 different dependent variables: three horizons for
each of the four forecasted variables with both a range and central tendency forecast.  The
term
k
ti t j x −− is the t-j information variable that was available when the forecast was made.
Thus, j = 2 when the dependent variable is a July next-year forecast error, and j = 1 when
it is a current-year forecast error.  The superscript k refers to information variable
included in our efficiency test.
In principle, we could test efficiency against any information that was available at
the time the forecasts were made. In Table 4a, we include the most recently available
information on the variables being forecastedænominal GDP growth, real GDP growth,
inflation, and the unemployment rate.   The table includes the p-values for the t-statistic
testing the null hypothesis that b = 0.  We also report Q-statistics to test for serial
correlation in the forecast errors.  These Q-statistics come from the regression of the
forecast error on the last observed value of the forecasted variable.  For example, in Table
4a, the first row of results are calculated using the 18-month nominal GDP forecast error.
The Q-statistic is taken from the equation that includes past nominal GDP growth on the
right hand side.  In the second row, the forecast error for real GDP growth is the
dependent variable and the Q-statistic is taken from the equation that includes past GDP
growth as the information variable.  The results are arranged first by forecast horizon.12
The top panel includes tests using the 18-month forecasts. The July next-year
forecast is made before the current-year results are known, so in this case we use the
results from the previous year.  We are testing whether the 18-month forecast errors from
year t are related to the variables dated t-2.  We report results using both the range and
the central tendency forecasts.  In the case of the full range, coefficients on nominal GDP
growth, real GDP growth, and inflation are statistically significant at a 10 percent critical
level.  In the case of the central tendency forecasts, the nominal GDP forecast errors are
related to past nominal GDP growth and past inflation.  Inflation forecast errors are
related to past inflation and to the past unemployment rate.
The 12-month forecasts are shown in the middle panel.  There is only one
significant coefficient among the 24 reported.  The central tendency forecast for nominal
GDP growth is correlated with last years nominal GDP growth.  However, 6 of the 8 Q-
statistics have probability values less than 10 percent.  In the case of the 6-month
forecasts, none of the Range forecasts were related to past values of the information
variables, but both the nominal and real GDP forecasts errors were serially correlated.
Since the FOMC was also setting targets for the money supply and the fed funds
rate for much of this period, the forecasts were checked for efficiency with respect to
information about monetary growth and interest rates.  The FOMC set targets for M1,
M2, and M3; all were included.  Also included were the currently observed interest rates
for overnight fed funds rate, 1-year Treasury bills and the 10-year Treasury bonds.
Although the FOMC does not set targets for the Treasury rates, they embody expectations
about future inflation and future overnight interest rates.  13
The results including money and interest rates are shown in Table 4b.  The
monetary data were those reported to the FOMC at the first policy meeting of the year.
They are fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates.  The interest rates are averages
for the months of January (used with the February forecasts) and June (used with the July
forecasts).  Again there is almost no evidence that this information was ignored.  An
exception may be the 18-month central tendency forecasts for nominal GDP and
inflation.  Here the forecast errors for nominal GDP growth and inflation are significantly
related to interest rates.  Only in one case, the 6-month forecast error for the
unemployment rate, was past money growth significant.
With some exceptions, the forecast errors appear to be serially correlated, but
unrelated to our information variables.  When the forecasts fail tests for efficiency, it is
usually a forecast calculated from the central tendency rather than the range.  We
estimated 240 coefficients on past information.  We found that 19 of these were
significant at a 10 percent level and of those 19, only 4 applied to cases using a range
forecast.  Overall, there were fewer significant coefficients than one would expect to
observe by chance, even if the forecasts were fully efficient.
5.  Do either the Range or Central Tendency Forecasts Encompass the Other?
In this section, we test whether either CT or FR encompasses the other.  We say
that one forecast encompasses another if it incorporates all of the relevant information.  If
it does, then adding information from the other will not help predict the actual value.  We
run the following regression:
,
fr ct fr
tt i t c t t i t t i t xx c x β ε −− − −= + +                                                        (4)14
where we compare the range and central tendency forecasts of x, x
fr, and x
ct.  Forecast x
fr
encompasses x
ct if bct = 0.  We test the alternative, that is, forecast x
ct encompasses x
fr , by
switching the roles of range and the central tendency forecasts.  The results of the
encompassing tests are shown in Table 5.  The results are p-values for the t-statistic
testing that the coefficient b is equal to zero. In all cases except the unemployment
forecasts, the probability values are greater than 10 percent and we cannot reject that they
both encompass the other.  In practical terms, this means that if you have one forecast,
you do not need the other.   In the case of the unemployment rate, we can reject that the
18- and 12-month range forecasts encompass the central tendency forecasts, and that the
12- and 6-month central tendency forecasts encompass the range.  In practical terms, this
means that there is useful and independent information in both forecasts.
6.  Conclusions 
This article reviews two decades of experience with FOMC forecasts.  As one
would expect, forecasts calculated from the full range are very similar to those calculated
from the central tendency.  In the two cases where there is a significant difference, the
forecasts constructed from the full range were more accurate than those calculated from
the central tendency.  In two cases where the FOMC was forecasting the next calendar
year in July, we found that the nominal GDP and inflation forecasts that included the
outliers were significantly more accurate than those taken from the central tendency.  We
also found that the sizes of the ranges reported were not very closely related to the
inherent unpredictability in a variable.  Nominal and real output growth rates were more
variable and less predictable than inflation, but the range for the high and low 18-month15
inflation forecasts were larger than those for the output measures.  One inference is that
there was a wide difference of opinion among FOMC members regarding the medium-
term outlook for inflation, relative to the underlying predictability of inflation. This may
explain, in part, the FOMC’s reluctance to publicly commit to an inflation target. 
We could not reject the hypothesis that the FOMC forecast was unbiased in any
case involving nominal or real output growth.  In contrast, all 6 forecasts of inflation
were significantly biased.  In the case of the unemployment rate, we could reject
unbiasedness for all of the forecasts calculated from the full range, but not for any from
the central tendency. 
In general, the FOMC passed tests for efficiency when the tests involved past
values of nominal and real output growth, inflation, the unemployment rate, interest rates
and the money supply.  To the extent that central tendency and the full range were
different, the central tendency failed the tests more often, especially in the cases using the
18-month forecasts.  The encompassing tests did not distinguish between the central
tendency and the full range forecasts. 
Overall, the full-range forecasts produced smaller RMSEs and were more
efficient than the central tendency forecasts.  For the purposes of doing research using the
FOMC’s GDP growth and inflation forecasts, the full range is almost certainly preferred,
since it did at least as well on every count as the central tendency.  Furthermore, the Fed
published the full range from July 1979 on whereas the central tendency did not become
available until 1983.16
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Table 1: FOMC Forecasts  
FULL RANGE CENTRAL TENDENCY
FORECAST HORIZON 6-month 12-month 18-month 6-month 12-month 18-month
Nominal GDP Mean Error  -0.31 -0.17 -0.43 -0.35 -0.18 -0.59
RMSE








Width of range in percentage points 1.61 2.09 2.37 0.66 0.72 0.98
Percent of time outside the range 53 58 44 79 89 72
Real GDP Mean Error -0.01 0.25 0.19 0.00 0.20 0.09
RMSE








Width of range in percentage points 1.11 1.43 1.55 0.42 0.53 0.51
Percent of time outside the range 68 68 50 95 100 78
Inflation Mean Error -0.29 -0.41 -0.60 -0.34 -0.39 -0.65
RMSE








Width of range in percentage points 0.95 1.32 1.94 0.39 0.49 0.63
Percent of time outside the range 47 53 39 89 74 67
Unemployment Mean Error -0.15 -0.29 -0.31 -0.12 -0.20 -0.23
RMSE








Width of range in percentage points 0.56 0.64 0.88 0.19 0.22 0.35
Percent of time outside the range 37 68 67 68 89 78
Notes: Wilcoxon’s signed-rank test is used to test the null hypothesis that the forecasts are equally
accurate (that is, the RMSEs are equal).   The significance levels were computed from a program provided
by Rob van Son found at http://www.fon.hum.uva.nl/Service/Statistics/Signed_Rank_Algorihms.html. 
Shaded cells indicate that the probability value is less than 10 percent.
  The data span the period 1983-2001 for 6 and 12-month horizons and 1984-2001 for 18-month horizon.19
Table 2:  A Relative Measure of FOMC Consensus 
Forecast horizon
6-month 12-month 18-month
Nominal GDP 1.21 1.28 1.28
Real GDP 1.40 1.76 1.72
Inflation 1.08 1.05 0.87
Unemployment 1.35 1.86 1.83
The values in this table are calculated as the ratio of the RMSE to 1/2 the width of
range as reported in table one.  It is a measure of the predictive uncertainty (RMSE)
divided by an inverse measure of policy consensus.  Therefore, a high number
indicates a relatively high degree of consensus.20
Table 3: Tests for Unbiasedness (For 1983/4 to 2001 only)
     Equation (1)                                          
fa
tt i t t i t xx α β ε −− =+ +  
     Equation (2)                                         ( )
fb
tt i t t i t xx γ ε −− −= +                            





Nominal 18-month FR 1.444 (1.94) 0.681 (0.33) 0.326 0.245
GDP 18-month CT 2.182 (1.72) 0.541 (0.28) 0.101 0.141
12-month FR 0.269 (1.32) 0.925 (0.22) 0.823 0.596
12-month CT 0.674 (1.41) 0.855 (0.23) 0.720 0.599
6-month FR -0.477 (0.86) 1.028 (0.14) 0.396 0.172
6-month CT -0.56 (0.80) 1.035 (0.13) 0.268 0.104
Real GDP 18-month FR -0.124 (1.49) 1.121 (0.56) 0.829 0.560
18-month CT 0.644 (1.67) 0.794 (0.61) 0.915 0.800
12-month FR -0.068 (0.92) 1.115 (0.32) 0.677 0.412
12-month CT -0.697 (1.08) 1.33 (0.38) 0.542 0.484
6-month FR -0.301 (0.47) 1.098 (0.15) 0.799 0.960
6-month CT -0.312 (0.48) 1.105 (0.15) 0.781 1.000
Inflation 18-month FR 0.115 (0.54) 0.775 (0.16) 0.002 0.001
18-month CT 0.592 (0.59) 0.615 (0.17) 0.001 0.003
12-month FR 0.233 (0.41) 0.79 (0.13) 0.006 0.005
12-month CT 0.256 (0.43) 0.788 (0.13) 0.012 0.009
6-month FR -0.075 (0.35) 0.926 (0.11) 0.028 0.009
6-month CT -0.198 (0.35) 0.952 (0.11) 0.009 0.002
Unemploy- 18-month FR 1.425 (0.96) 0.713 (0.16) 0.058 0.099
ment 18-month CT 1.48 (1.01) 0.713 (0.17) 0.122 0.218
12-month FR 0.798 (0.56) 0.824 (0.09) 0.019 0.033
12-month CT 1.144 (0.57) 0.779 (0.09) 0.032 0.160
6-month FR 0.395 (0.40) 0.909 (0.06) 0.080 0.072
6-month CT 0.671 (0.35) 0.868 (0.06) 0.036 0.152
Note that FR represents the forecasts calculated as the midpoint of the full range and CT
represents the forecasts calculated as the midpoint of the central tendency.21
Table 4a: Are the FOMC Forecasts Efficient? History of Forecast Variables
(Using May vintage for July Forecasts)  Values in the Table are probability values for the t-
statistic on the coefficient β  in equation (3):
.
k
t it t itj t it ex u αβ −− − − =+ +
18-month forecasts
Range                x
k = Nominal GDP Real GDP Inflation U-Rate Q*
Nominal GDP 0.01 0.08 0.30 0.82 0.38
Real GDP 0.08 0.17 0.51 0.34 0.23
Inflation 0.10 0.28 0.34 0.11 0.16
Unemployment Rate 0.17 0.23 0.73 0.03 0.01
Central Tendency
Nominal GDP 0.02 0.17 0.10 0.86 0.47
Real GDP 0.10 0.22 0.48 0.46 0.18
Inflation 0.11 0.62 0.05 0.07 0.04
Unemployment Rate 0.19 0.31 0.60 0.05 0.01
12-month forecasts
Range
Nominal GDP 0.21 0.58 0.25 0.70 0.03
Real GDP 0.27 0.46 0.57 0.28 0.06
Inflation 0.67 0.71 0.14 0.12 0.11
Unemployment Rate 0.52 0.48 0.90 0.05 0.05
Central Tendency
Nominal GDP 0.10 0.38 0.23 0.60 0.01
Real GDP 0.21 0.48 0.37 0.21 0.09
Inflation 0.24 0.57 0.32 0.15 0.01
Unemployment Rate 0.42 0.44 0.94 0.02 0.22
6-month forecasts
Range
Nominal GDP 0.25 0.64 0.23 0.67 0.00
Real GDP 0.10 0.30 0.28 0.49 0.01
Inflation 0.58 0.38 0.58 0.70 0.11
Unemployment Rate 0.22 0.20 0.93 0.08 0.04
Central Tendency
Nominal GDP 0.14 0.56 0.11 0.64 0.00
Real GDP 0.03 0.21 0.15 0.41 0.03
Inflation 0.34 0.22 0.66 0.55 0.16
Unemployment Rate 0.12 0.08 0.75 0.01 0.39
* Q is a test for randomness based on the first four autocorrelations of the residual in the
regression with the lag of the forecast variable.  For example, in the first row we use the
residuals from the equation including lagged nominal GDP growth.22
Table 4b: Are the FOMC Forecasts Efficient? Interest Rates and Money
(Using June interest rates for July forecasts and January rates for February Forecasts)
Values in the Table are probability values for the t-statistic on the coefficient β  in equation (3):
.
k
t it t itj t it ex u αβ −− − − =+ +
18-month forecasts Treasury Treasury Fed funds Monetary Aggregates
Range                x
k = 10-year 1-year Overnight m1  m2  m3
Nominal GDP 0.17 0.13 0.11 0.83 0.99 0.96
Real GDP 0.54 0.37 0.26 0.87 0.91 0.70
Inflation 0.06 0.11 0.23 0.40 0.77 0.46
Unemployment Rate 0.94 0.54 0.38 0.13 0.81 0.70
Central Tendency
Nominal GDP 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.93 0.87 0.96
Real GDP 0.45 0.30 0.21 0.60 0.95 0.72
Inflation 0.03 0.06 0.14 0.26 0.83 0.58
Unemployment Rate 0.79 0.44 0.30 0.14 0.92 0.76
12-month forecasts
Range
Nominal GDP 0.35 0.32 0.34 0.99 0.54 0.42
Real GDP 0.67 0.57 0.59 0.94 0.46 0.36
Inflation 0.20 0.29 0.30 0.87 0.83 0.90
Unemployment Rate 0.67 0.83 0.99 0.42 0.65 0.67
Central Tendency
Nominal GDP 0.27 0.25 0.26 0.99 0.59 0.45
Real GDP 0.59 0.46 0.46 0.92 0.34 0.26
Inflation 0.12 0.24 0.25 0.83 0.46 0.55
Unemployment Rate 0.68 0.99 0.79 0.27 0.56 0.63
6-month forecasts
Range
Nominal GDP 0.78 0.96 0.86 0.40 0.86 0.73
Real GDP 0.70 0.66 0.49 0.54 0.82 0.62
Inflation 0.89 0.47 0.37 0.54 0.94 0.84
Unemployment Rate 0.66 0.47 0.57 0.15 0.96 0.70
Central Tendency
Nominal GDP 0.53 0.65 0.53 0.46 0.89 0.68
Real GDP 0.48 0.42 0.26 0.42 1.00 0.89
Inflation 0.91 0.51 0.36 0.96 0.76 0.54
Unemployment Rate 0.57 0.57 0.76 0.07 0.98 0.70
* Q is a test for randomness based on the first four autocorrelations of the residual in the
regression with the lag of the forecast variable.  For example, in the first row we use the
residuals from the equation including lagged nominal GDP growth.23
Table 5
Encompassing Tests for the FOMC Forecasts: Range and Central Tendency
Probability Values for the t-statistic on β  in equations (4):
,
fr ct fr
tt i t c t t i t t i t xx c x β ε −− − −= + + and
ct fr ct
tt i t f r t i t t i t xx c x β ε −− − −= + +
Nominal GDP Forecasts Real GDP Forecasts

















18-month 0.31 0.17 0.83 0.69
12-month 0.57 0.80 0.64 0.37
6-month 0.68 0.84 0.45 0.41


















18-month 0.11 0.26 0.07 0.14
12-month 0.18 0.28 0.05 0.04
6-month 0.73 0.78 0.23 0.03



































































































Actual values (dashed lines) are those first available in February of the following year.
The range forecast is shown by a solid line and the central tendency by the line with
triangles.25
Data Appendix   
The FOMC forecasts are taken directly from the Monetary Policy Reports to Congress.
The first report was made in February 1979, but forecasts were not included with the
initial release of the report.  
Tables A1 through A4 include the nominal GDP growth, real GDP growth, inflation and
fourth quarter average unemployment rate forecasts.  These forecasts come from the
semi-annual monetary policy reports made by the Fed.  The inflation forecasts in Table
A3 include forecasts for a mix of price indexes, the output deflator, the CPI and the chain
price index for personal consumption expenditures.
Table A5 and A6 include the real time data from the Federal Reserve Bank Philadelphia
web site.forecasts.  The data are constructed from the quarterly data files that include
vintages of data that were available in the middle of each indicated month—February,
May, August and November.  For example, the February 1980 file contains the data that
were available to the FOMC in 1980 when the Fed made its February 1980 monetary
policy report.  The exception was for 1995.  In early 1996, the Bureau of Economic
Analysis switched to the chain weighted indexes for GDP and delayed publishing the
initial release until March of 1996.  Therefore, the February data for the fourth-quarter
over fourth-quarter value for 1995 comes from the March issue of the Survey of Current
Business (Table 7.1).
Table A7 includes the fourth quarter-over-fourth quarter growth rates of the monetary
aggregates as they were reported following the annual benchmarking in February each
year.   This is the real-time monetary data that the FOMC would have had at the first
FOMC meeting each year.  This table also includes the real-time CPI data and PCE chain
price data.  The monetary growth rates and consumer price index are taken from the
monetary policy reports.  The real-time price data for personal consumption expenditures
are from the February release of the Survey of Current Business.  Table A8 includes the
January and June monthly average interest rates for overnight fed funds, one-year
Treasury bills and 10-year Treasury bonds.  These are from the Fed’s H.15 release. 26
Table A1 FOMC  











1979 8 to 10
1980 8.5 to 11.5 7.5 to 11 5 to 7.5
1981 8.5 to 11.5 9 to 12 10 to 11.5
1982 9.5 to 12.25 8 to 10.5 5.5 to 7.5
1983 7 to 9.5 7.25 to 11.25 8 to 9 9.25 to 10.75 9.75 to 10
1984 7 to 10.25 9 to 10 8 to 10.5 9 to 10 9.5 to 11.5 10.5 to 11
1985 6.75 to 9.5 8 to 9 7 to 8.5 8.5 to 8 6.25 to 7.75 6.5 to 7
1986 5.5 to 8.5 7 to 7.5 5 to 8.5 6.5 to 7.25 3.75 to 6.5 4.75 to 5.75
1987 5 to 8.25 6 to 7.5 4.5 to 7.5 5.75 to 6.5 5.75 to 7.25 6.25 to 7
1988 5 to 8 5.75 to 7 4 to 6.5 5.25 to 6 4 to 7 5.75 to 6.75
1989 4 to 7.5 5 to 7 5.5 to 8.5 6.5 to 7.5 5 to 7.75 6 to 7
1990 4.25 to 7.5 5.5 to 6.75 4 to 7 5.5 to 6.5 5 to 6.5 5.5 to 6.5
1991 3.5 to 7 5.25 to 6.5 3.5 to 5.5 3.75 to 5.25 3.75 to 5.75 4.5 to 5.25
1992 4 to 6.75 5.5 to 6.5 4 to 6 4.5 to 5.75 5 to 6.25 5.25 to 6
1993 4.5 to 7 5.5 to 6.25 5.25 to 6.25 5.5 to 6 4.75 to 6.25 5 to 5.75
1994 4.5 to 6.75 5 to 6.5 4.75 to 7.5 5.5 to 6 5.25 to 6.5 5.5 to 6
1995 4.5 to 6.25 5 to 5.5 4.75 to 6.5 5 to 6 3.75 to 5.25 4.25 to 4.75
1996 4.625 to 5.5 4.75 to 5.375 4 to 5 4.25 to 4.75 4.75 to 5.75 5 to 5.5
1997 4 to 5.5 4.25 to 5 4.25 to 5.25 4.5 to 4.75 5 to 6 5 to 5.5
1998 4.25 to 5.75 4.5 to 5 3.5 to 5 3.75 to 4.5 4.25 to 5 4.5 to 5
1999 4 to 5.5 4.25 to 5 3.75 to 5 4 to 4.5 4.75 to 5.5 5 to 5.5
2000 4 to 5.25 4 to 5 5 to 6 5.25 to 5.5 6 to 7.25 6.25 to 6.75
2001 5 to 6.25 5.5 to 6 3.75 to 5.25 4 to 5 3.25 to 5 3.5 to 4.25
The date refers to the calendar year being forecasted.  For example, the July next-year
Range forecast for 1980 (8.5 to 11.5) was made in July 1979.  27
Table A2 
FOMC Real GNP/GDP Forecasts 









1979 -2 to -0.5
1980 -0.5 to 2 -2.5 to 0.5 -5 to -2.5
1981 0.5 to 3 -1.5 to 1.5 1 to 3.5
1982 1 to 4 0.5 to 3 0.5 to 1.5
1983 2.5 to 4  to  3 to 5.5 3.5 to 4.5 4.75 to 6 5 to 5.75
1984 3 to 5 4 to 4.5 3.5 to 5 4 to 4.75 6 to 7 6.25 to 6.75
1985 2 to 4 3 to 3.25 3.25 to 4.25 3.5 to 4 2.25 to 3.25 2.75 to 3
1986 2 to 4 2.5 to 3.25 2.75 to 4.25 3 to 3.5 2.25 to 3.5 2.5 to 3
1987 2 to 4.25 3 to 3.5 2 to 4 2.5 to 3 2 to 3.75 2.5 to 3
1988 1 to 3 2.5 to 3 0.5 to 3 2 to 2.5 1 to 3.25 2.75 to 3
1989 1 to 3 2 to 2.5 1.5 to 3.25 2.5 to 3 1.5 to 2.75 2 to 2.5
1990 1 to 2.5 1.5 to 2 1 to 2.25 1.75 to 2 1 to 2 1.5 to 2
1991 0 to 3 1.75 to 2.5 -0.5 to 1.5 0.75 to 1.5 0.5 to 1.5 0.75 to 1
1992 2 to 3.5 2.25 to 3 1.5 to 2.75 1.75 to 2.5 2 to 3.25 2.25 to 2.75
1993 2.5 to 3.5 2.75 to 3 2.5 to 4 3 to 3.25 2 to 3.5 2.25 to 2.75
1994 2 to 3.25 2.5 to 3.25 2.5 to 3.75 3 to 3.25 3 to 3.5 3 to 3.25
1995 2.25 to 2.75 2.5 to 2.75 2 to 3.25 2 to 3 1.375 to 3 1.5 to 2
1996 2.125 to 3 2.25 to 2.75 1.5 to 2.5 2 to 2.25 2.5 to 3 2.5 to 2.75
1997 1.5 to 2.5 1.75 to 2.25 2 to 2.5 2 to 2.25 3 to 3.5 3 to 3.25
1998 2 to 3 2 to 2.5 1.75 to 3 2 to 2.75 2.75 to 3.25 3 to 3.25
1999 2 to 3 2 to 2.5 2 to 3.5 2.5 to 3 3.25 to 4 3.5 to 3.75
2000 2 to 3.5 2.5 to 3 3.25 to 4.25 3.5 to 3.75 3.75 to 5 4 to 4.5
2001 2.5 to 4 3.25 to 3.75 2 to 2.75 2 to 2.5 1 to 2 1.25 to 228
Table A3 
FOMC  Inflation Forecasts 









1979 9.5 to 11
1980 8.5 to 10.5 9 to 11 9 to 10
1981 7.75 to 9.5 9 to 10.5 7.5 to 9
1982 6.5 to 8.5 6.5 to 7.75 4.75 to 6
1983 4 to 5.75 3.5 to 5.5 4 to 5 4 to 5.25 4.25 to 4.75
1984 3.25 to 6.5 4.25 to 5 4 to 6 4.5 to 5 3.25 to 4.5 4 to 4.5
1985 3.5 to 6.5 5.25 to 5.5 3 to 4.75 3.5 to 4 3.5 to 4.25 3.75 to 4
1986 3 to 5.5 3.75 to 4.75 2.5 to 4.5 3 to 4 1.5 to 3.25 2.25 to 2.75
1987 1.5 to 4.25 3 to 4 2.5 to 4 3 to 3.5 3 to 4.25 3.5 to 4
1988 2.5 to 5 3.75 to 4.25 2.5 to 4 3.25 to 3.75 2.75 to 4 3 to 3.75
1989 2 to 5 3 to 4.5 3.5 to 5.5 4.5 to 5 4.5 to 5.75 5 to 5.5
1990 3 to 5.75 4.5 to 5 3.5 to 5 4 to 4.5 4 to 5 4.5 to 5
1991 3.5 to 5 3.75 to 4.5 3 to 4.5 3.25 to 4 3 to 4.5 3.25 to 3.75
1992 2.5 to 4.25 3 to 4 2.5 to 3.5 3 to 3.5 3 to 3.5 3 to 3.5
1993 2.5 to 4 2.75 to 3.25 2.5 to 3 2.5 to 2.75 3 to 3.5 3 to 3.25
1994 2 to 4.25 3 to 3.5 2.25 to 4 3 to 3 2.5 to 3.5 2.75 to 3
1995 2 to 4.5 2.75 to 3.5 2.75 to 3.75 3 to 3.5 3 to 3.5 3.125 to 3.375
1996 2.5 to 3.5 2.875 to 3.25 2.5 to 3 2.75 to 3 3 to 3.25 3 to 3.25
1997 2.5 to 3.25 2.75 to 3 2.75 to 3.5 2.75 to 3 2 to 2.75 2.25 to 2.5
1998 2.5 to 3 2.5 to 3 1.5 to 2.5 1.75 to 2.25 1.25 to 2.25 1.75 to 2
1999 1.5 to 3 2 to 2.5 1.5 to 2.5 2 to 2.5 1.75 to 2.5 2.25 to 2.5
2000 1.75 to 2.5 2.25 to 2.5 1.5 to 2.5 1.75 to 2 2 to 2.75 2.5 to 2.75
2001 1.75 to 3 2 to 2.5 1.75 to 2.5 1.75 to 2.25 2 to 2.75 2 to 2.5
1979 through 1988 the FOMC reported forecasts for the GNP/GDP deflator, from 1989
through 1999, the FOMC reported forecasts for the CPI, and fin 2000 and 2001, the FOMC
reported forecasts for the Chain Price Index for Personal Consumption Expenditures29
Table A4 
FOMC  4
th Quarter Average Unemployment Rate Forecasts 









1979 6.25 to 7
1980 6.75 to 8.25 6.75 to 8 8.5 to 9.25
1981 8 to 9.25 8 to 8.5 7.5 to 8.25
1982 7 to 8.5 8.25 to 9.5 9 to 9.75
1983 8.5 to 9.5 9.5 to 10.5 9.9 to 10.4 9 to 9.75 9.5 to 9.5
1984 8.25 to 9.25 8.25 to 8.75 7.25 to 8 7.25 to 7.75 6.5 to 7.25 6.75 to 7
1985 6.25 to 7.25 6.5 to 7 6.5 to 7.25 6.75 to 7 6.75 to 7.25 7 to 7.25
1986 6.75 to 7.5 6.75 to 7.25 6.25 to 6.75 6.5 to 6.5 6.9 to 7.2 7 to 7
1987 6.5 to 7 6.75 to 6.75 6.5 to 6.75 6.5 to 6.75 6.1 to 6.5 6.2 to 6.4
1988 5.9 to 6.8 6 to 6.5 5.5 to 6.75 5.75 to 6 5.25 to 6.5 5.25 to 5.75
1989 5 to 7 5.5 to 6 5 to 6 5.25 to 5.25 5 to 6 5.5 to 5.5
1990 5 to 6.5 5.5 to 6 5.5 to 6.5 5.5 to 5.75 5.5 to 6.5 5.5 to 5.75
1991 5.25 to 7 5.5 to 6 6.25 to 7.5 6.5 to 7 6.5 to 7 6.75 to 7
1992 6 to 6.75 6.25 to 6.5 6.75 to 7.25 6.75 to 7 7 to 7.5 7.25 to 7.5
1993 6.5 to 7.25 6.5 to 7 6.5 to 7 6.75 to 7 6.5 to 7 6.75 to 6.75
1994 6.25 to 7 6.5 to 6.75 6.5 to 6.75 6.5 to 6.75 6 to 6.25 6 to 6.25
1995 5.75 to 6.5 6 to 6.25 5.25 to 6 5.5 to 5.5 5.5 to 6.25 5.75 to 6.125
1996 5.5 to 6.25 5.75 to 6.125 5.5 to 6 5.5 to 5.75 5.25 to 5.75 5.5 to 5.5
1997 5.5 to 6 5.5 to 5.75 5.25 to 5.5 5.25 to 5.5 4.75 to 5.25 4.75 to 5
1998 4.5 to 5.25 4.75 to 5 4.5 to 5 4.75 to 4.75 4.25 to 4.5 4.25 to 4.5
1999 4.25 to 4.75 4.5 to 4.75 4.25 to 4.75 4.25 to 4.5 4 to 4.5 4 to 4.25
2000 4 to 4.5 4 to 4.25 4 to 4.25 4 to 4.25 4 to 4.25 4 to 4
2001 4 to 4.5 4 to 4.25 4.5 to 5 4.5 to 4.5 4.75 to 5 4.75 to 530
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1978 12.91 4.26 8.29 5.83 13.11 4.44 8.30 5.83
1979 9.87 0.83 8.97 5.87 9.92 0.96 8.87 5.87
1980 9.82 -0.03 9.86 7.50 9.39 -0.34 9.75 7.50
1981 9.31 0.67 8.58 8.37 9.80 0.86 8.87 8.37
1982 3.27 -1.23 4.56 10.67 3.50 -0.87 4.40 10.67
1983 10.37 6.06 4.06 8.47 10.50 6.20 4.05 8.47
1984 9.35 5.62 3.53 7.20 9.53 5.70 3.62 7.20
1985 5.78 2.54 3.15 7.00 5.37 2.14 3.16 7.00
1986 4.42 2.21 2.16 6.83 4.18 2.04 2.10 6.83
1987 7.23 3.85 3.25 5.90 7.45 4.00 3.31 5.90
1988 7.02 2.71 4.19 5.33 7.23 2.81 4.29 5.33
1989 6.37 2.43 3.85 5.30 6.44 2.57 3.77 5.30
1990 4.34 0.35 3.98 5.90 4.50 0.49 3.99 5.90
1991 3.22 0.23 2.99 6.97 3.28 0.27 3.00 6.97
1992 5.36 2.92 2.37 7.33 5.71 3.15 2.48 7.33
1993 5.11 2.84 2.21 6.53 5.36 3.10 2.19 6.53
1994 6.38 4.00 2.28 5.57 6.47 4.14 2.24 5.57
  1995* 3.68 1.27 2.37 5.57 3.68 1.27 2.37 5.57
1996 5.18 3.36 1.76 5.27 4.97 3.14 1.77 5.27
1997 5.76 3.89 1.80 4.70 5.58 3.74 1.77 4.70
1998 5.07 4.15 0.88 4.40 5.17 4.25 0.88 4.40
1999 5.92 4.25 1.60 4.10 6.26 4.60 1.59 4.10
2000 5.92 3.49 2.34 3.97 5.80 3.41 2.31 3.97
2001 1.94 0.13 1.81 5.60 2.34 0.48 1.86 5.60
   Fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates
   * February real-time values for 1995 were not actually released until March.  The values
here are taken from the Survey of Current Business, March 1996, Table 7.1. 31
Table A6 




















1978 13.39 4.80 8.20 5.83 13.39 4.80 8.20 5.83
1979 9.92 0.96 8.87 5.87 9.92 0.96 8.87 5.87
1980 9.39 -0.34 9.75 7.50 9.39 -0.34 9.75 7.50
1981 9.63 0.72 8.84 8.37 9.63 0.72 8.84 8.37
1982 2.55 -1.74 4.37 10.67 2.55 -1.74 4.37 10.67
1983 10.36 6.35 3.77 8.47 10.36 6.35 3.77 8.47
1984 9.53 5.70 3.62 7.20 9.53 5.70 3.62 7.20
1985 6.30 2.89 3.31 7.00 6.30 2.89 3.31 7.00
1986 4.48 2.21 2.22 6.83 4.48 2.21 2.22 6.83
1987 8.32 5.04 3.12 5.90 8.32 5.04 3.12 5.90
1988 7.53 3.40 4.00 5.33 7.53 3.40 4.00 5.33
1989 5.58 1.82 3.69 5.30 5.58 1.82 3.69 5.30
1990 4.50 0.49 3.99 5.90 4.50 0.49 3.99 5.90
1991 3.45 0.10 3.35 6.97 3.45 0.10 3.35 6.97
1992 5.71 3.15 2.48 7.33 6.73 3.87 2.76 7.33
1993 5.01 3.11 1.84 6.53 5.01 3.11 1.84 6.53
1994 6.47 4.14 2.24 5.57 6.47 4.14 2.24 5.57
1995 3.78 1.30 2.45 5.57 3.78 1.30 2.45 5.57
1996 5.57 3.25 2.24 5.27 5.57 3.25 2.24 5.27
1997 5.58 3.83 1.69 4.70 5.58 3.83 1.69 4.70
1998 5.17 4.25 0.88 4.40 5.85 4.61 1.18 4.40
1999 6.52 4.96 1.48 4.10 6.52 4.96 1.48 4.10
2000 5.31 2.81 2.43 3.97 5.31 2.81 2.43 3.97
2001 2.00 0.05 1.95 5.60
        Fourth-quarter-over-fourth-quarter growth rates32
Table A7
Real-Time Data for Monetary Aggregates and other price indexes
Output Forecasts











1980 7.3 9.8 9.9
1981 2.3 9.4 11.4
1982 8.5 9.2 10.1
1983 7.2 8.3 9.7
1984 5.2 7.7 10.5
1985 12.7 8.6 7.4
1986 15.2 8.9 8.8
1987 6.2 4 5.4
1988 4.3 5.3 6.2
1989 0.6 4.6 3.3 4.5
1990 4.2 3.9 1.8 6.3
1991 8 3.1 1.3 2.9
1992 14.3 1.9 0.5 3.0
1993 10.5 1.4 0.6 2.7
1994 2.3 1 1.4 2.6
1995* -1.8 4.2 6.1 2.6
1996 -4.5 4.6 6.8 3.1
1997 -1.2 5.7 8.8 1.9
1998 1.8 8.5 10.9 1.5
1999 1.9 6.2 7.5 2.6
2000 -1.8 5.6 8.9 3.4 2.4
2001 6.9 10.3 12.9 1.333
Table A8


































1978 7.96 7.28 6.7 8.46 8.09 7.6
1979 9.1 10.41 10.07 8.91 9.57 10.29
1980 10.8 12.06 13.82 9.78 8.16 9.47
1981 12.57 14.08 19.08 13.47 14.86 19.1
1982 14.59 14.32 13.22 14.3 14.07 14.15
1983 10.46 8.62 8.68 10.85 9.66 8.98
1984 11.67 9.9 9.56 13.56 12.08 11.06
1985 11.38 9.02 8.35 10.16 7.8 7.53
1986 9.19 7.73 8.14 7.8 6.73 6.92
1987 7.08 5.78 6.43 8.4 6.8 6.73
1988 8.67 6.99 6.83 8.92 7.49 7.51
1989 9.1 9.05 9.12 8.28 8.44 9.53
1990 8.21 7.92 8.23 8.48 8.1 8.29
1991 8.09 6.64 6.91 8.28 6.36 5.9
1992 7.03 4.15 4.03 7.26 4.17 3.76
1993 6.6 3.5 3.02 5.96 3.54 3.04
1994 5.75 3.54 3.05 7.1 5.27 4.25
1995* 7.78 7.05 5.53 6.17 5.64 6
1996 5.65 5.09 5.56 6.91 5.81 5.27
1997 6.58 5.61 5.25 6.49 5.69 5.56
1998 5.54 5.24 5.56 5.5 5.41 5.56
1999 4.72 4.51 4.63 5.9 5.1 4.76
2000 6.66 6.12 5.46 6.1 6.17 6.53
2001 5.16 4.81 5.98 5.28 3.58 3.97